The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Limits of Equal Treatment in Corporation Law by Booth, Richard A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 3 Article 3
1984
The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Limits of
Equal Treatment in Corporation Law
Richard A. Booth
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Booth, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Limits of Equal Treatment in Corporation Law, 38 Sw L.J. 853 (1984)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol38/iss3/3
THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE AND




N the law of corporations, the business judgment rule provides that
absent special circumstances the courts will not second-guess decisions
of corporate officers and directors. When special circumstances, such
as self-dealing, failure to manage, lack of any valid business purpose, or
irrationality prevail, the courts will review management decisions and shift
the burden of justifying the decision to the manager.' The rationale for the
rule is simple: corporate managers are in the best position to exercise dis-
cretion relating to the conduct of business. To second-guess corporate de-
cision makers from the insular position of the courts would unduly limit
the range of decisions open to managers by increasing the risk of share-
holder challenge.2
Self-dealing is no doubt the best known exception to the business judg-
ment rule. In its simplest form, self-dealing may consist of a director's sale
of a piece of property to the corporation.3 The obvious danger in such
sales is that the director will have overcharged or foisted a useless item on
the corporation. When no such conffict of interest is present, the courts
presume that the director is acting in the best interests of the corporation.4
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1. The business judgment rule is codified in many states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 144 (1982). See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 1040-1041, 1295 (perm. ed. 1975); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW 75-77, 86-88 (1972); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97 (1979). The term "manager" is used herein to include both officers
and directors.
2. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 95-100; infra note 160 and accompanying text.
3. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
4. Self-dealing is often very difficult to detect. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,
CORPORATE FINANCE 622 (2d ed. 1979); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 340-44 (1974). Nevertheless, the business
judgment rule by its very nature requires that the plaintiff point to particular facts that tend
to show an abuse, not merely circumstances indicating an opportunity for abuse. See John-
son v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
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When such a conflict exists, however, the question arises as to whose inter-
est is being pursued.5 In such cases, the courts are willing to review the
fairness of the transaction. 6 The transaction is not prohibited, however,
because it may be in the interest of both parties.
Nevertheless, in some self-dealing cases, particularly those relating to
defensive maneuvers in takeover battles, proxy fights, dividend declara-
tions, and until recently, parent-subsidiary mergers, the courts allow de-
fendants to skirt the burden of justifying decisions by requiring only that
some business purpose be shown for the transaction in question.7 Yet the
corporate manager undoubtedly benefits personally in these cases both
monetarily and otherwise. Even though the plaintiff has shown self-deal-
ing, if the manager has shown a proper business purpose, the plaintiff may
still be required to bear the much heavier burden of proving that no busi-
ness purpose exists.8
Moreover, the courts do not generally require that the manager's proper
purpose be balanced against the personal benefit to the manager, but re-
quire only that a purpose be shown. 9 Why does the burden in some cases
shift back to the plaintiff to prove that any relief at all should be granted?
Aside from the fact that nonmonetary relief is usually more difficult for a
plaintiff to obtain,' 0 it is unclear why in these circumstances the manager,
who is a fiduciary, is given the benefit of the doubt. Indeed, he will almost
certainly be able to accomplish the planned transaction at some price,
rather than being held to a rigid duty not to benefit personally at share-
holder expense. I I
As with the straightforward example of a director's sale of property, the
manager does not always benefit at the shareholders' expense when the
business purpose test is applied. While the manager invariably does bene-
fit by his use of corporation property, facilities, and power (by remaining
in control or by choosing a dividend policy advantageous to himself, for
example), the shareholder does not invariably lose. The corporation may
5. The question almost always is present, however. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980); infra text accompanying note 46.
6. "Fairness" is generally defined as what would have happened if arm's-length bar-
gaining had taken place. E. FOLK, supra note 1, at 86-88.
7. For examples, see infra notes 22-33, 40-41 (defensive maneuvers), 34-39 (proxy
fights), 99-104 (dividend declarations), 74-93 (freeze-outs), and accompanying text.
8. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 107-08, 132-33.
9. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980). This approach does not
mean that the monetary fairness of such transactions will not be scrutinized when possible.
For example, until recently in Delaware the fairness of interested mergers was reviewed
even though a business purpose had already been shown. See infra notes 74-90 and accom-
panying text. When the issue is not an immediately monetary one, however, as in a proxy
fight, it is difficult to find anything to scrutinize. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text. In such cases the only possible relief appears to be injunctive.
10. Indeed, equitable relief is generally considered available only if the plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law, that is, if the plaintiff cannot be made whole by an award of money
damages. See 1I C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942
(1973).
11. See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979). But see
Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372, 1374 (Del. Ch. 1978).
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in fact be better off under current management than it would be under new
management after a take-over battle or proxy fight. 12 The problem, of
course, is that a results-oriented test will not do. The legal decision must
usually be made before the outcome of the struggle is known, and since in
those instances the decision affects the outcome, what would have been
will never be known. 13
Some commentators have argued for a rule of strict equal treatment in
business purpose cases in which such a rule could apply. For example, in
connection with freeze-out mergers, in which the outside shareholder is
forced to take cash while the inside shareholder keeps his stock, some com-
mentators have argued that equal treatment is so fundamental a value in
corporation law that in certain circumstances these mergers should be
banned altogether, even though they can be accomplished within the letter
of the law.14 In a closely related area, some commentators contend that a
controlling shareholder should not be permitted to sell his shares for more
than market price unless the opportunity is afforded pro rata to all the
shareholders.1 5 Yet almost without exception the courts have rejected the
rule of equal treatment, often with the unsupported explanation that insid-
ers have some right to exercise control for selfish reasons. 16
In other applications of the business purpose doctrine, notions of equal
treatment apply, but with strange consequences. In the proxy contest area,
one commentator has suggested that insiders pay their own expenses or
that the corporation pay everyone's expenses. 17 The prevailing rule is
12. This proposition seems self-evident, but many commentators argue that the ability
of management to oppose take-overs by nonmonetary means (or indeed any means) should
be severely curtailed or even prohibited. See infra note 62.
13. Instances do occur in which preliminary relief is denied and the litigation takes long
enough that hindsight may be applied. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497,
508 (Del. 1981). The resemblance to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle that the observa-
tion of an event alters the event itself must be acknowledged, though no evidence that corpo-
rations obey the laws of physics has been found.
14. Brudney, .4 Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1022-23 (1975); Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1367 (1978). Inter-
estingly, these authors argue that business purpose is irrelevant in freeze-out mergers, but
they distinguish between permissible mergers between a parent and subsidiary and imper-
missible mergers carried out by forming a shell corporation. They argue that the former
may result in real economic gains ("synergy"), while the sole significant motivation for the
latter is to get rid of the outside shareholders. The distinction is precisely the one that the
business purpose test originally contemplated, see Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199
A.2d 548, 554-55 (Sup. Ct. 1963), although the test may arguably mean something quite
different in connection with freeze-outs. See infra text accompanying notes 81-90.
15. The literature on this thesis is aptly summarized in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS 511-13 (5th ed. abr. 1980). The most notable case in which the issue arose
was Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). The essential similarity between
freeze-out and sale of control cases, though not generally noted, is apparent if one thinks in
terms of the majority shareholders' appropriation of an opportunity. See Brudney & Chirel-
stein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 345-46 (1974);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 715-30 (1982).
16. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 511-13; infra text accompanying
notes 103-15. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), is one of the few excep-
tions, and is an equivocal one.
17. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489,
1491 (1970).
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firmly in favor of insiders; as long as the controversy relates to business
policy, insiders may cause the corporation to pick up the tab even though
incidentally, or not so incidentally, the insiders thereby perpetuate their
control.' 8 Except for the prevailing use of the word "policy" instead of
"purpose," the standard in the area of proxies is clearly the business pur-
pose test.
The requirement of equal treatment is strongest with respect to divi-
dends, because no exceptions exist. In a sense, however, the shareholder
typically decries equal treatment. He is forced to take or forgo dividends
at the discretion of insiders, who may, either primarily or incidentally, be
serving their own interests.19 When no inequality of treatment is present,
no self-dealing in the ordinary sense exists. Business purpose is the kind of
exception that must apply, but the question is how payment of a dividend
serves a business purpose anyway.
The central issues in this discussion of self-dealing transactions are why
such transactions are subject to differing standards of evaluation, and how
a plaintiff is to identify the potentially protected self-dealing transaction.
In each case, except in an interested merger, the common feature is that a
single solution must be chosen. Only one group may manage, and only
one dividend policy may be followed. In a typical self-dealing case the
transaction in question is not necessary. This distinction suggests that the
business purpose test applies in circumstances in which avoiding deadlock
is important. 20
This Article concludes that good reasons ultimately justify protection of
certain selfishly motivated uses of control. These reasons lie in the very
nature of the corporation and are intimately related to the corporate char-
acteristics of perpetual existence, limited liability of shareholders, manage-
ment by a board of directors, and standardized equity participation
through share certificates. 21 Further, it appears that a reliable and general
rule describing permissible behavior in these transactions cannot be for-
mulated. Business purpose seems to be a concept that is defined by stating
what it is not. It should not, therefore, be expected to provide a positive
standard appropriate to affirmative proof by defendant managers.
I. THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE AND CONTESTS FOR CONTROL
The place of business purpose in the review of corporate decisions first
emerged in a Delaware case, Cheff v. Mathes.22 In Cheffthe company was
18. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
15, at 325-26; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 14, at 1356-57; Brudney & Clark, A New
Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1054-55 (1981).
21. While the business judgment rule does apply in the partnership context, the business
purpose test does not apply, because decisions regarding such fundamental concerns as re-
quire alteration of the partnership agreement must be made unanimously in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h) (1914) [hereinafter cited
as UPA]; see A. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 381-82 (1968).
22. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Cheff v. Mathes was not, however,
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threatened with take-over by a purchaser who, in the view of the directors,
intended either to liquidate the company or to drastically alter its business
practices. 23 In order to stave off this attack, the company repurchased
some of its own shares on the open market and finally bought at a modest
premium the block that had been acquired by the attacker. This transac-
tion was then challenged by a minority shareholder, who argued that the
directors had caused the corporation to repurchase the shares in order to
preserve their jobs. The plaintiff charged that the repurchases were in fact
self-dealing transactions and that the price paid by the corporation was
unfair since it was in excess of the stock's current market price.
The court distinguished the conffict of interests that the directors of the
company had from those of the president and the company's attorney.24
The court held that both were required to justify their actions, but that the
burden on the directors was considerably lighter since the directors' per-
sonal interest in the transactions (as substantial shareholders) was much
the same as that of any shareholder.25 The president and the attorney, on
the other hand, could have been motivated by their desire to keep their
salaried jobs. The court held that the business judgment rule did not pro-
tect the transaction from challenge, but decided that the officers had met
their burden of proof by showing a legitimate reason for the transactions
and by demonstrating the decision had been made in good faith and after
reasonable investigation. 26 The court also said that the officers should not
be penalized for an honest mistake in judgment. 27
Though it alluded to the problem, the court did not explain how
strongly the officers must believe in a threat to the company's business
practices when the officers are motivated simultaneously by a desire to
keep their positions.28 Although it would be difficult to quantify the effect
sui generis. The origins of the doctrine can be traced back at least fifty years, though before
Cheff v. Mathes a distinctive rule was not set down. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14,
187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234,
92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960); Bennett v. Brueil
Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17
A.2d 309 (1941); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A.
226 (1934); Anderson v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541
(1950). In each case the action challenged was plainly legal, but for the threat of takeover.
23. 199 A.2d at 551-52.
24. Id at 554.
25. Id.; see Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 129 A.2d 242 (1957);
infra note 135. The court noted in another context, however, that it was well known that a
large block of shares would sell for more than market price because of their attendant con-
trol. 199 A.2d at 555. Thus the plaintiff could have argued that the nonofficer directors did
have a pecuniary interest unlike that of a typical shareholder, namely, the premium they
might be able to command as controlling insiders.
26. Id. at 554-55. The decision seems to suggest that the rule arises under a director's
duty of care more than under his duty of loyalty. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 115-21.
27. 199 A.2d at 555.
28. Id at 554-55. To a certain extent, "motive" and "purpose" are terms of art in Dela-
ware. See Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1957). "Mo-
tive" usually refers to the actual reasons for a transaction, while "purpose" indicates focus
on the formal reasons or the effect. As noted in Cheff, the rule of Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del.
Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962), is that when the motive is unacceptable a proper
19841
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of the two motivations, the court seemed quite careful not to say that the
repurchases were motivated primarily by one or the other concern. If the
belief that the attacker would change the company's business practices
need only be genuinely held, even if it pales in importance beside the of-
ficers' desire to keep their jobs, the rule set down in Cheffdiffers little from
the business judgment rule. Although proving the existence of a business
purpose is the burden of the defendant officers, that burden is very light.
29
Delaware courts first interpreted business purpose quite narrowly. In
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.30 the Delaware chancery court held
that a board's decision to oppose a tender offer, by issuance of a swing
block of shares to a "white knight," was made without sufficient investiga-
tion into the merits of the take-over offer.3 ' The chancery court found no
evidence that the aspirant to control would alter significantly the business
of the target and ordered the newly issued shares cancelled.32 Although
the target raised several apparently valid reasons for its actions in opposi-
tion, the court seemed to interpret Cheff v. Mathes to require some showing
of likely damage to the corporation's business. Since this episode, how-
ever, the courts have taken an increasingly expansive view of business pur-
pose in connection with the purchase or issuance of shares or any sort of
defense against a take-over attempt. 33
The issue in Cheff is functionally similar to that raised by a proxy con-
purpose cannot save the transaction. The reader is invited to come to his own conclusions
about the efficacy of this distinction.
29. Note, however, that the burden is necessarily the defendant's; the plaintiff cannot be
expected to prove that insiders had no purpose other than to preserve their offices. See
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
30. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
31. Id. at 776. The term "white knight" refers to a company that purchases a target that
is being threatened by takeover by a company that, for some reason, is seen as an undesir-
able new owner.
32. 230 A.2d at 776.
33. See Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977); Petty v. Penntech Pa-
pers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975); Ward Foods, Inc. v. Lambert (Del. Ch. 1972),
reported in I DEL. J. CORP. L. 137, 144-45 (1976); see also Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d
1081, 1096 (10th Cir. 1972) (court will not impose its business judgment on management
unless facts are compelling); McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388, 394 (lst Cir. 1958)
(only in extreme case will court substitute its judgment for those so charged); Northwest
Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (because a wide
measure of discretion is given those in control, mere differences of judgment are insufficient
for judicial intervention); Tallant v. Executive Equities, Inc., 232 Ga. 807, 209 S.E.2d 159,
161 (1974) (courts will not interfere in business matters merely involving management's dis-
cretion); Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795, 803
(1964) (as long as board of directors acts for good of corporation, court will not interpose its
judgment). But see Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1976);
Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975). In addition io a motivation to
preserve control, the cases have noted the possibility of other, more profitable uses for the
money in cases of issuer repurchases. See generally Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transac-
tions Affecting Corporation Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 270-72 (1966); Note, Buying Out
Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 313-14 (1960).
Two distinct issues are present here: (1) the propriety of stock transactions intended to
keep the incumbents in power; and (2) the propriety of purchasing an insurgent's shares at a
premium. Both issues involve unequal treatment, but of different kinds. The latter may be
thought of as an unequal dividend. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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test, in which a similar sort of self-dealing is common. In Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Co.34 the plaintiff challenged the expenditure
of corporation money for proxy solicitation made by the defeated manage-
ment team, apparently on the theory that the expenditures were motivated
by the desire of management to perpetuate itself in office. The court held
that ordinarily directors may look to the corporation for payment, since
holding otherwise would impede the voting process in uncontested cases
and unduly favor the insurgents in proxy contests.35 Thus, in the case of a
contest, management was privileged to use corporate funds to make its
views known about matters of policy.36 The court pointed out, however,
that in a "purely personal power contest" corporation funds may not be
used.37 Yet, clearly any dispute may be cast in terms of policy. The rule
here is the same as in Cheff. this sort of self-dealing will be tolerated if
minimally justified by reference to policy, that is, business purpose. 38
The courts have with increasing frequency grappled with the extent to
which actions of incumbent management in thwarting hostile take-over
attempts should be subject to review. For example, the target company
may sell important assets, or it may merge with a competitor of the aspir-
ant and render the proposed acquisition illegal under the antitrust laws.39
Whether such transactions are wise, in the absence of a take-over bid, is
34. 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
35. 128 N.E.2d at 292-93.
36. Id. at 293.
37. Id; accordLevin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Kaufman v. Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp.
604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); Hall v.
Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226 (1934); Street v. La-
clede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1966); Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., 49 Misc. 2d
322, 267 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 27 A.D.2d 646, 276 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1966); see E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL ch. 21 (1957).
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658, 70 L. Ed. 2d 631(1981). The range of defensive tactics as well as opinions concerning their propriety is al-
most limitless. See, e.g., Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control.An Analogue to Deter-
mine the Validity of Target Management Defense Measures, 66 IowA L. REV. 504 (1981);
Gelfond & Sebastian, Re-Evaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender
Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101 (1979); Lipton, Take-Over Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An UpdateAfter One
Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Re-
sponse to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980); Lynch & Stein-
berg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979);
Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation.: Tactics and Strategies After Marathon, 36 Sw. L.J. 975
(1983); Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contests
for Corporation Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 169 (1981); Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender
Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087
(1982); Weiss, Tender Offers and Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 445(1978); Comment, Anti-Takeover Maneuvers.: Developments in Defense Tactics and Target
Actionsfor Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw. L.J. 620 (1981); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State
Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1983); Note, Developments in Corporate Takeover
Techniques.- Creeping Tender Offers, Lock- Up Arrangements and Standstill Agreements, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095 (1982); Note, Corporate Director's Liabili or Resisting a Tender
Offer: Proposed Substantive and Procedural Modications of Existing State Fiduciary Stan-
dards, 32 VAND. L. REV. 575 (1979). See infra notes 61-62.
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clearly a question the courts will not ordinarily address under the business
judgment rule. Yet in the face of a take-over bid, such transactions may
unquestionably be intended to protect existing management. The poten-
tial for abuse is evident, but the courts have been reluctant to require any-
thing more than management's demonstration of a business purpose.
40
Indeed, in most cases the courts do not even require a business purpose,
but follow the business judgment rule, which is still more favorable to
incumbents. 41
No apparent effort has been made in any of these areas to balance busi-
ness purpose and personal advantage. Precisely that failing prompted a
vigorous and instructive disagreement in the Third Circuit case of Johnson
v. Trueblood42 The case involved a faltering limited partnership and a
general partner who consistently opted for remedial measures that would
leave him in control. Eventually the venture became bankrupt and the
plaintiffs sued the general partner. Faced with the business judgment rule
as a defense, plaintiffs argued that the defendant should be liable if perpet-
uation of control was a motive for defendant's various actions.
Judge Seitz, a former Delaware Chancellor, wrote the majority opinion.
In essence the majority opinion held that when control is the alleged mo-
tive, the plaintiff must show some sort of bad faith on the part of a business
fiduciary. 43 This generally requires that the plaintiff show that retention of
control is the sole, or at least primary, motive for defendant's challenged
action.44 As Judge Seitz noted, directors are not ordinary fiduciaries, who
are not permitted any conflict of interest.45 Corporate managers operate in
conflict of interest as a matter of course. The judge observed that every
decision may well be tainted by the director's "desire to keep shareholders
satisfied so they will not oust him."' 46 In an original formulation, which
40. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 658, 70 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir.
1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980).
The nature of the transactions typically alleged to have been motivated by a desire to perpet-
uate control often causes conceptual difficulties. Transactions in stock, sales of assets, acqui-
sitions, and the like are undoubtedly protected by the business judgment rule under ordinary
circumstances, and a plaintiff who would challenge such a transaction bears the burden of
proof. But does the fact that a tender offer has been made or is threatened change the
authority of the board to conduct its business? Heightened scrutiny may be appropriate
unless something in the transaction negates the need for it. See Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 365 (2d Cir. 1980) (sale to white knight inconsistent with motive to
preserve control; transaction governed by business judgment rule; burden on plaintiffs).
Commentators are very much divided on the propriety of this sort of defense, even though
they tend to agree that in the interest of maximizing shareholder wealth other sorts of de-
fenses should be severely curtailed. See infra note 62.
42. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980).
43. Id at 293.
44. Id
45. Id at 292.
46. Id Corporate managers are not trustees. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d
503, 514-15 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The reason for this statement is not self-evident, but it implies
that circumstances exist in which a trustee would be held to have breached a duty even
though a manager would not. See infra text accompanying note 59.
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may not have survived review in Delaware,47 Judge Seitz stated that "the
business judgment rule seeks to alleviate this problem by validating certain
situations that otherwise would involve a conflict of interest for the ordi-
nary fiduciary. '48 When the action is "arguably taken for the benefit of the
corporation" the directors are presumed to have acted properly.49
Judge Rosenn, in a dissenting opinion, strongly disagreed.50 He viewed
Delaware law as requiring that once a plaintiff shows that retention of
control is involved, the burden shifts to the incumbent to show that his
action was taken primarily for the benefit of the corporation.5' The basic
rationale of the business judgment rule, he argued, was that the courts
should defer to a director's expertise when such expertise is likely to be
greater than that of the court, but the justification disappears in the face of
actual evidence of a conflict of interest.5 2
The question seems to center on the true rationale for the business judg-
ment rule, or, more precisely, the business purpose rule. Judge Rosenn's
formulation has two shortcomings. First, it ignores the fact, pointed out by
Judge Seitz, that some motive to control is always present. The standard
to be applied should take into account the sort of job the potential defend-
ant has been chosen to do. To the extent to which the job naturally in-
volves conflicts of interest, the expected conflicts do not constitute a valid
reason to second-guess the jobholder. 3 Second, Judge Rosenn's formula-
tion assumes that some meaningful comparison between business and per-
sonal motivations can be made. Consider the proxy contest case: how
could one ever separate a motivation to remain in control from running for
office? Yet few, if any, would argue that for the corporation to pay reason-
able proxy solicitation expenses for incumbents even when there is a fight
going on is prima facie improper.54
47. Delaware courts have been more willing in the recent past to review management's
exercise of discretion and, in some cases, to substitute their own. See Zapata Corp. v. Mal-
donado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Fischel, The Race to the Bottom Revisited- Re-
flections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 935-
41 (1982). But see Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAW. 401 (1983).
48. 629 F.2d at 292.
49. Id
50. Id at 295.
51. 1d at 301.
52. Id In a sense, Judge Rosenn's formulation is quite correct: the courts of Delaware
do shift the burden when actual evidence of self-dealing, fraud, or the like is introduced.
However, Judge Seitz's point was that there was no actual evidence here; rather, the evi-
dence was purely circumstantial. The incumbent had every reason to want to remain in
office and gave himself the benefit of every doubt whenever possible. But this does not
constitute self-dealing (or fraud or over-reaching) in Delaware. The line is unquestionably a
fine one, but Delaware does try to walk it. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703
(Del. 1983); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (both requir-
ing that specific improprieties be pleaded in order to state claim challenging an interested
merger).
53. Obviously the corporate election process itself is permeated with self-interest. As
argued below, however, this may have at least some positive value. See infra notes 150-67
and accompanying text.
54. Eisenberg, supra note 17; see Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Co., 309
N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955).
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The dialogue in Johnson v. Trueblood demonstrates that the business
purpose rule is no mere contrivance. It reflects a genuine analytical diffi-
culty that arises both from the nature of business and from the common
law system that favors money damages over other forms of relief. When a
corporate fiduciary sells a parcel of property to the corporation, self-deal-
ing takes place, and the court will review the price.55 When the action in
question involves control, price can be important, but the courts require a
far greater showing when a plaintiff seeks relief other than money.5 6 In
essence the courts require convincing proof that the plaintiff is more enti-
tled to the specific benefit taken than is the defendant.5 7 In most cases,
however, neither party really deserves to be in control. The courts typi-
cally will remain neutral, unless the defendant has committed some breach
of faith in addition to seizing and holding on to the indivisible opportunity
to control. Seizing the benefit will be tolerated unless it can be shown
affirmatively to have injured the enterprise.5 8 After all, the controlling po-
sition does no one any good unless it is occupied.
The alternative is clearly unacceptable. If personal motivations were to
be prohibited and the burden placed on the defendant to prove that his
actions were prompted solely, or even primarily, by concern for the corpo-
ration, more often than not insurgents would win. Despite an inclination
to root for the underdog, a presumption in favor of ousting incumbents is
not a sound approach to doing business. 59 Moreover, one should expect
55. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Everett v. Phillips, 288
N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483,
121 N.E. 378 (1918).
56. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
57. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 107-08, 132-33. In the typical self-dealing case the issue
is essentially whether the manager has been unjustly enriched. Damage to the plaintiff is
largely irrelevant; he need only show an "interest" in the transaction. See, e.g., State v.
Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 341 N.E.2d 223, 378 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1975); Saunders v. Kline,
55 A.D.2d 887 (N.Y. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 388 (1933) (agent who
profits from transactions made on behalf of principal must return profits to principal); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 203 (1957) (trustee must return profits arising from ad-
ministering trust). Thus in some circumstances restitution is often much easier for a plaintiff
to obtain. Compare Murray v. Standard Pecan Co., 309 Ill. 226, 140 N.E. 834, 836 (1923)
(purchaser of stock could not compel issuer to repurchase under unauthorized agreement
made by issuer's agent), with Seifert v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 191 Minn. 362, 254
N.W. 273 (1934) (purchaser of stock may rescind and have restitutuion under unauthorized
repurchase agreement). Indeed, plaintiffs sometimes are granted "restitution," in spite of
strong arguments that they have not been damaged, in order to rectify the defendant's unjust
enrichment effectively. Compare Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910,
301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (complaint need not include allegations of actual damage), with
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (exist-
ence of damages presumed when causation presumed under federal law), andDirks v. SEC,
103 S. Ct. 371, 77 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1983) (plaintiff must prove defendant's improper motive in
trading on inside information). The business purpose doctrine tends to apply in situations in
which the courts require a showing both of damage to the plaintiff and unjust enrichment to
the defendant. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 3 (1936).
58. See infra note 98.
59. Eisenberg, supra note 17. Clearly this reasoning does not apply in the case of a
trustee, which is precisely the point that Judge Seitz was making in Johnson v. Trueblood.
Trustees are generally not entitled to their position and cannot engage in any activity in
competition with the interest of the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 170, comment
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incumbents to fight in contests for control.60 The typical justification for
shifts in corporate control is that an acquiring entity is willing to pay good
money for control because it will put the assets of the corporation to work
more profitably. In the case of a tender offer, shareholders will tender if
they think the company under current management is not worth as much
as is bid. If the offeror bids enough to satisfy a majority of the current
shareholders, control will shift. Tendering shareholders, nontendering
shareholders, and the economy will all be better off.6' Many commenta-
tors therefore argue that incumbents should not be allowed to take any
special steps to retain control.62
Simple as this formula is, it is not without difficulties. The argument
that management should remain passive is based on the notion that in an
efficient market, and in the absence of external distorting forces, a rational
public shareholder who is not also an incumbent manager should tender
for any premium (or indeed no premium given the opportunitiy to save
brokerage commissions), since the chances of doing better by holding on to
the stock are no greater than even.63 According to the argument itself, the
decision to tender has nothing to do with the prospects of the target com-
pany, whose virtues are already reflected in the market price.
Rational behavior for the shareholder, however, is not necessarily ra-
tional behavior for the target company's managers. The managers may
(b) (1957). In a business good reasons exist to encourage the manager to believe that he has
a personal interest in the venture. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194-97 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role] (arguing that target company man-
agement should acquiesce to tender offer; courts have not adopted this view). But see
Brudney, supra note 14, at 1029-30; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 15, at 365-68; Brud-
ney & Clark, supra note 20, at 1023-24; Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932). The ability to pursue control for selfish reasons, or
indeed no well articulated reason at all, may also serve important social functions. See infra
text accompanying notes 150-67.
60. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Co., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 292-
93 (1955).
61. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics and Shareholders' Wel-
fare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1740 (1981). Acquirors, it seems, make only normal profits.
62. See Bebchuck, The Casefor Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1028 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59; Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Structural Approach]. Easterbrook and Fischel argue
that management should take no steps to oppose a tender offer since any premium over
market price represents a gain to target shareholders and permitting resistance will reduce
the total number of tender offers made by increasing the average cost of the transaction
itself. Gilson and Bebchuck argue that it should be permissible for target management to
seek a higher price from other acquirers, while Easterbrook and Fischel maintain that even
this tactic reduces overall shareholder welfare, because the total number of bids is reduced
as a result of the disadvantage of bidding first. See also Bebchuck, The Casefor Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers. A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Reply & Extension] (supporting "auctioneering" in tender offers); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Sunk Costs] (arguing in favor of facilitating competing
tender offers); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer De-
fense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Seeking Competitive Bids] (arguing
against defensive tactics); supra note 39.
63. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, passim.
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legitimately disagree with the beliefs of the average trader. After all, only
management can know for sure what its strategy is. While the market in
effect sets the odds, just as in parimutuel betting, management is in a very
good position to know whether the bet should be made. Defensive tactics
are readily justifiable if the stock market is efficient, since under such con-
ditions the perceptions of shareholders and managers can legitimately
diverge.64
Moreover, premiums offered in tender offers are often substantial. 65 It
appears that market price does not accurately reflect what most sharehold-
ers think their stock is worth, since a tender offer at a premium above
market price may still be priced too low to induce half of the shareholders
to tender.66 Even if the offer does succeed, it will not have been enough to
64. Most would no doubt ultimately agree with this thesis if it could be shown that
defensive tactics are usually undertaken to protect opportunities that are somehow incapable
of being disclosed, either because they are inchoate or because they would be appropriated.
Defensive tactics may be a target's way of protecting information about business prospects
that has leaked as far as a potential acquiror, but not into the market. While Proi ssors
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that defensive tactics unduly discourage first bidders because
they increase the riskiness of investment in investigating targets, id at 1178-79, one could as
well argue that if defensive tactics were prohibited, target companies would be unduly dis-
couraged from direct investment in projects difficult to keep secret. See supra note 62. This
factor is suggested, though not precisely addressed, in the dialogue between Professors Eas-
terbrook and Fischel and Martin Lipton. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 61; Lipton,
supra note 39.
Surely some tender offers are resisted because of the threat that opportunities will be
obtained at bargain prices and because the target's management recognizes this even though
the public does not. One certainly would think that managers are the quickest to recognize
opportunities. This explanation is at least a more likely one than the explanation that man-
agers behave irrationally in opposing tender offers. The question is: Is resistance under-
taken for such reasons or is it prompted primarily by management's desire to perpetuate
itself in office? The question is the business purpose test. To suggest that the question
should automatically be answered one way or the other is a matter of politics; it indicates
additional beliefs about human nature that are not addressed.
65. See G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS (1980); R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, Eco-
NOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 228-31 (1980); DeAngelo,
DeAngelo & Rice, Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth 27-28, 36
(1982) (unpublished manuscript); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper role, supra note 59, at
1187-90; Weston, Industrial Concentration, Mergers and Growth, in II MERGERS AND Eco-
NOMIC EFFICIENCY (1980).
66. Large premiums may be due to legal rules, defensive tactics, and bidding competi-
tion. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1175. However, this
explanation does not account for the substantial premiums paid in cash-out mergers in
which defensive tactics and bidding competition do not exist, much less in cash-out mergers
at a premium in those jurisdictions where legal rules are more relaxed than they were in
Delaware. Indeed, except for bidding competition, there is no apparent connection between
the cause and the effect. While defensive tactics may defeat an offer, how offering more can
counter moves designed to operate against the offeror in a nonmonetary way remains un-
clear.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1188-90. They note that
after a failed tender offer, the price of the target often rises. They suggest that this may be
due to the market's perception that the bid is only the first round of a longer auction or that
management has been roused to action. One could just as well argue that such a price
increase is due to the public shareholders' being reassured, by another company's interest,
that the business of the target is in fact quite promising. The kind of information conveyed
cannot be determined unless the questions in the minds of shareholders are known. These
explanations for price rises after thwarted tender offers assume that the price set in an effi-
cient market is the most accurate measurement of the value of a share of stock. But even if
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compensate that part of the shareholder population that opted to hold out
for more.67
A fair assumption is that the controlling shareholders are among the
nontenderers, otherwise they would have put their own substantial invest-
ments elsewhere. The controlling shareholders are presumably entitled to
their views too,68 but their ability to make them known is limited. Since
the market often, if not always, undervalues the controlling shareholders'
stock,69 they may be threatened even if they are doing an optimum job.
The mere fact that a tender offer succeeds in shifting control does not nec-
essarily mean that the company was less well-managed in the first place. 70
One commentator has suggested that if the incumbents are correct they
to outguess the market for purposes of trading is impossible, there are good reasons to credit
individual shareholders' opinions in the context of a tender offer. See R. Booth, The New
Law of Freeze-Out Mergers (1984) (unpublished manuscript). Among the more salient rea-
sons are (1) that market prices are by definition set by the least optimistic of current share-
holders (those most ready to sell), and (2) the existence of a tender offer alters the way a
rational shareholder values any individual stock, by converting the largely random process
by which stocks are picked to compose a portfolio into the equivalent of a negotiation with
the offeror company. The suggestion of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel that the defeat
of a tender offer and a rise in the target stock's price thereafter may owe to the shareholders'
viewing it as but the first step in a longer auction is certainly a possible explanation, but not
the only one. Thus it does not follow that defensive tactics should be prohibited categori-
cally. See infra note 70. These views are largely supported by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see R. Booth, suprapassim.
67. Note, however, that if upon receiving the tenders of 50% + I of the shares, the
bidder could force all the rest of the shareholders to sell at the same price, half the share-
holders would be undercompensated and half would be overcompensated. The bidder,
however, would have paid a total price that approximated the total of shareholder valua-
tions. One could fault the distribution, although it is pro rata, but one could hardly fault the
successful bidder as having obtained any kind of windfall. Convincing a court that the
bidder should be required to pay more to those undercompensated would be difficult, be-
cause the bidder has already paid out full value. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969,
971 (Del. 1977). A tender offeror will often, however, threaten to force the sale of the re-
maining shares at a lower price. See Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire
Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485, 487 (1983). For a critical analysis of two-tier
pricing, see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 15, at 336, 340; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 14, at 1359-65.
68. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). Although the idea that in an efficient market a
shareholder should tender for any premium is at first. compelling, it does suggest that man-
agement resistance is irrational. Managers who are substantial shareholders should also be
induced to tender. Manaoers who are not important shareholders should, in the interest of
their professional reputations, negotiate a sale.
69. This follows from the phenomenon that the market price is set by the most willing
seller, as well as the fact that insiders could quite legally sell out at a premium if they so
desired. See supra notes 15, 64 & 66.
70. Other things being equal, the opinion of the shareholders as to the value of the
target company under current and proposed management is, and should be, an important
factor in the success or failure of a tender offer. Management may legitimately disagree with
the shareholders' assessment, however, especially since the market serves as no guide once
an offer has been made and the factors to be assessed in deciding whether the price is ade-
quate (for example, risk) are so subjective. Circumstances in which the shareholders' collec-
tive opinion is distorted may exist, however. An example is the period after a long
depression in the stock market. Indeed, it seems that tender offers are far more common in
depressed markets, although no reason dictates believing that discrepancies in manage-
ment's ability or innovative ideas are more common in bearish times than in bullish times.
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should be able to find a white knight,7' but that statement assumes a shift
in control will occur simply because someone decided to make a tender
offer. Unless one believes that most corporations are inefficiently managed
and that shifts in control are somehow to be favored over the status quo,
corporate managers clearly should be as free to defend their incumbency
in take-over battles as they are in proxy fights.72 It might be suggested that
if the incumbents believe that they are the best managers, they should be
willing to offer more for the company's stock than the bidder. Aside from
the practical question of where the money, a scarce commodity, is to be
obtained, this solution effectively forces the corporation to reduce its capi-
tal and in effect to declare a dividend, at the prompting of an outsider.
That might often defeat the very investment plans on which the incum-
bents base their optimistic valuation. Managers need to be able to use
their office to keep themselves in office if a fair fight is to be had. The
business purpose doctrine is recognition of that need.7
3
II. THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE AND EXERCISE OF CONTROL
The preceding cases have all involved the use of control to retain con-
trol, but other cases have occurred in which the. business purpose doctrine
has been applied. These cases involve the use of control to effect transac-
tions beneficial to a controlling shareholder.
Without doubt the most notable application of the business purpose
doctrine was in Singer v. Magnavox Co.,74 a case that has been overruled
on that very point. Singer arose from a cash-out merger following a tender
offer. The parent corporation had acquired eighty-four percent of
Magnavox's stock in the tender offer and soon afterwards effected a cash-
out merger at the same price as the tender offer price. The remaining
71. Structural Approach, supra note 62, at 868.
72. For example, if a company really were inefficiently managed, management could
profit by looking for a purchaser of the assets and taking credit for the move. If they could
so profit, presumably they would. This dilemma is unavoidable in economic analysis: trans-
actions are explained as movements of assets to their most productive uses. The difficulty is
that after the free market has operated for a while, everything would already be optimally
allocated and transactions would stop. The scenario is somewhat fanciful, but it raises the
disturbing question of what is the status of the market in question as analysis commences.
Has the market already reached equilibrium or has it somehow been kept from it or are the
apparent obstructions to trade relatively minor details that arise for other reasons once equi-
librium has been achieved? See supra note 13.
73. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the business judgment rule arises
from a manager's duty of care, rather than his duty of loyalty and has been misapplied in the
context of tender offer defenses when conflicts of interest are naturally present. Easterbrook
& Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1194-1204. Their characterization of the busi-
ness judgment rule in its garden variety is accurate, but beside the point. Properly speaking,
the business purpose rule is what the courts have applied, because it fits circumstances in
which conflicts of interest are present. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 115-18, 127-30. Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel do argue consistently that conflicts of interest should be proscribed
and that managers, therefore, should remain passive in the face of tender offers. See Easter-
brook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982). The difficulty
with their position is that the courts do not regard conflicts of interest as per se improper for
corporate managers. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
74. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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shareholders of Magnavox sued. The court noted that even though the
merger satisfied the letter of the law, fiduciary duty imposed a higher stan-
dard and that a merger motivated solely by the parent's desire to eliminate
minority shareholders would therefore be illegal. 75 The court held that
minority shareholders have a right to the form of their investment and that
they should not be forced to give up their common stock unless the major-
ity could show a good reason for the transaction.76 Unless the merger had
a valid business purpose, the court held that it could be enjoined, 77 and
that even if a valid business purpose was shown, the merger would be re-
viewed for its "entire fairness." '78
The notion of entire fairness was apparently borne of the fact that re-
view of price alone was insufficient. In most cases, a shareholder who is
forced to surrender his shares in connection with a merger that he has
opposed is entitled by statute to have his shares appraised by a court and
to be paid in cash.79 Prior to Singer the courts of Delaware had held that if
a shareholder had a right of appraisal he could not maintain a lawsuit for
other sorts of relief (for example, rescission) unless he proved fraud; ap-
praisal ought to suffice if the only issue was fairness of price.80 Implicit in
the reasoning of Singer, however, was the premise that appraisal was an
inadequate remedy in the context of a parent-subsidiary merger. Scrutiny
for entire fairness was an effort to develop the sort of review that should
accompany business purpose cases: judicial review that somehow takes
into account nonmonetary issues.
In subsequent cases it became clearer that the Singer rule was to be in-
terpreted in a way that differed from most prior business purpose cases.
First, in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,81 the Delaware
Supreme Court confirmed that even though a valid business purpose ex-
isted for a freeze-out merger, the minority was entitled to a fairness hear-
ing. In Roland International Industries, Inc. v. Na/ar,s2 a case involving a
short-form merger,83 the Delaware court held in effect that a business pur-
pose for the merger must exist, even though the short-form merger statute
75. Id. at 978.
76. Id. at 977.
77. Id. at 980.
78. Id. at 977.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983).
80. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (1962); David
J. Green & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1971); see generally
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholders'Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1964) (appraisal remedy should not provide license to freeze-out minority
shareholder); Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 624, 653-55 (1981) (strict procedures and exclusivity of appraisal remedy allow possible
exploitation of minority shareholders); infra note 173.
81. 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977). Tanzer also held that the business purpose of the
parent or majority shareholder would suffice.
82. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
83. The short-form merger procedure allows a parent corporation that owns 90% or
more of a subsidiary to absorb it without a vote of the directors or shareholders of the
subsidiary. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983).
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clearly was intended to allow elimination of minority interests. 84 The
court unequivocally held that the burden rested on the majority to prove a
valid business purpose85 and that actions seeking money damages only
would be recognized even though in theory this was a purely equitable
cause of action based wholly on nonmonetary injury to minority share-
holders. 86 Finally, in Harman v. Masoneilan International, Inc.,87 the court
applied the business purpose test to a stock-for-stock parent-subsidiary
merger, even though the test had been devised to handle the perceived
inequity in cash mergers.
These refinements amount to a radically different concept of business
purpose. Under the traditional business purpose exception, plaintiffs had
been required to show that the only possible motivation for the transaction
was nonbusiness. 88 Under the Singer line of cases the parent was in effect
required to persuade the court of the need for the transaction. 89 In other
words, the majority shareholder was required to show a compelling busi-
ness purpose rather than a discretionary one. Even when such a showing
was made, however, the plaintiff was entitled to a fairness hearing. The
court had established a per se rule for parent-subsidiary mergers and in-
deed possibly all mergers. 90 The rule of Singer was not the traditional
business purpose rule, but something altogether different. No doubt the
reason for this departure from the traditional winner-take-all resolution of
business purpose cases lay in the unstated assumption that there is one
correct price for a share of stock and that if the majority can show that the
price can be achieved only if the majority rids itself of the minority, the
minority is all the more entitled to its share of the gain.
The business purpose test as defined by Singer and its progeny was de-
clared no longer to be of any "force or effect" in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.91
In order to cope with the value lost to the minority shareholder who is
forced to sell, the court modified its interpretation of the appraisal remedy,
presumably as it applies to all mergers, 92 and declared it once again to
exclude an action at equity except in cases of self-dealing, fraud, and the
84. 407 A.2d at 1037. Roland overruled Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., which had
held precisely the opposite. 187 A.2d at 80.
85. 407 A.2d at 1037; Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 976, 978-79 (Del. 1977).
86. 407 A.2d at 1035, 1037; see Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 494
(Del. 1981); supra note 57 and accompanying text.
87. 442 A.2d 487, 494 (Del. 1981).
88. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
89. One is tempted to assume that something either does or does not have a business
purpose, but requiring a plaintiff to prove that no purpose exists, or that the sole purpose is
nonbusmess, and requiring a defendant to demonstrate some positive purpose are very dif-
ferent. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1350 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
90. Few, if any, mergers are accomplished in one step, and Singer applied to all two-
step mergers. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 14, at 1359-65.
91. 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
92. The court's opinion does not indicate that the revised appraisal remedy is to be
limited to particular kinds of mergers. Since the revisions are based largely on statutory
language, any principled limitation was probably not intended.
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like.93 The court in effect imposed a negotiating model on future freeze-
outs, requiring a vote or other device to provide at least some assurance
that the minority would have sold its stock voluntarily and that a price
comparable to an arm's length price would be set.
On its face a cash-out merger presents a fact pattern distinctly similar to
that seen in contests for control, because in both cases only one winner will
emerge. If the majority can demonstrate that the minority is somehow the
cause of positive damage to the majority's shareholder interest, the parallel
is apparent, and if one believes that all shares of stock are of equal value,
the minority's entitlement to its proportionate share of the gain sought by
the majority is equally apparent. An important difference arises, however,
because the minority shareholder, whose interest is wholly monetary, can
be made whole.94
Whether the Weinberger decision will be read to overrule only the busi-
ness purpose test as enunciated in Singer, or will be viewed to have elimi-
nated the business purpose exception in all of its applications is unclear.
Any court tempted to resort to the doctrine will undoubtedly hesitate now
and, at the very least, will apply a heightened level of analysis.
A second branch of business purpose cases dealing with a controlling
shareholder's use of his position descends from Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Le-
vien.95 Sinclair owned ninety-seven percent of another oil producing com-
pany and controlled its board of directors. Over the course of seven years
the subsidiary had paid dividends fifty-four percent in excess of its earn-
ings. A shareholder of the subsidiary claimed that the dividends were paid
because of Sinclair's need for cash and that the subsidiary would have
been able to pursue growth opportunities if it had retained the money.
The court found that the dividends were paid within the letter of the law
and that, in the absence of self-dealing, the plaintiff must show that they
could not be grounded on any reasonable business objective before the
court would interfere.96 The court noted that self-dealing, which would
allow review for intrinsic fairness, could not be shown, since the dividends
had been paid equally to all shareholders. 97 The court stated that in order
to prevail the plaintiff must show that the payments were improperly moti-
vated and amounted to waste.98 While this requirement at first sounds like
93. 457 A.2d at 714; see supra note 80 and accompanying text; Cole v. National Cash
Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183, 187 (1931).
94. See infra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
95. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
96. Id. at 720-22.
97. Id at 721-22.
98. Id. at 722. The court followed a confusing path in reaching this conclusion. See
Arsht, supra note 1, at 105-07. First, it dismissed the defendant's argument that the business
judgment rule should be applied in the absence of "gross and palpable overreaching." 280
A.2d at 722. Then, in an ambiguous passage it stated that a manager's business judgment
will be respected unless the decision in question cannot be attributed to a rational business
purpose. The court further stated that the test of intrinsic fairness, with its shift in burden of
proof, will be applied if "the parent has received a benefit to the exclusion and at the expense
of the subsidiary." Id at 720 (emphasis added). After rejecting the test of abuse of discre-
tion, the court held that no self-dealing arises when equal treatment is present, and
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an alternative rule, it is in fact substantially equivalent to the business pur-
pose rule, but its application to dividends seems quite odd.99 One must ask
what possible business purpose the declaration of a dividend could serve
and how a corporation's paying out of substantial sums of cash could fur-
ther its business. The answer seems obvious. Dividends are part of the
bargain made between shareholders and the corporation.100 The court ap-
parently believes that if the dividends bear no reasonable relationship to
that bargain, then a remedy may be available. The construction of the
bargain, however, is left to controlling shareholders. Nevertheless, as was
noted by the courts in connection with freeze-outs, the controlling share-
holder's interest is as legitimate as that of anyone else.'10 Thus in this con-
text business purpose may comprehend both corporate purpose and
shareholder purpose, as it does in the retention of control cases. 0 2
III. THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF EQUAL TREATMENT
These issues invariably prompt commentators to recall the general rule
that shareholders are entitled to equal treatment. 0 3 Perhaps the strongest
judicial reaction to the notion that controlling shareholders are privileged
to favor themselves is found in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England, Inc. 104 In Donahue Mr. Rodd's family owned a controlling eighty
percent interest in the company, and the Donahue family owned a twenty
percent interest, acquired at the suggestion of Mr. Rodd when the com-
pany was purchased. Mr. Rodd desired to retire and arranged to transfer
most of his shares to various relatives. An arrangement was made with the
corporation to repurchase the remaining shares, representing an eighteen
percent interest, for $36,000. Mrs. Donahue sued on the theory that the
repurchase of Mr. Rodd's shares amounted to a preferential distribution in
his favor. The court concluded that the corporation in question was a
close corporation and that shareholders in a close corporation owe each
other a duty similar to that owed by one partner to another. 0 5 As a result
of this duty, the court concluded, a requirement of strict equal treatment
among shareholders arises.' 0 6 In a footnote the court significantly limited
recharacterized plaintiff's burden first as one to show improper motive and waste and then
as one to show fraud or overreaching. Id at 722. While the connotations of these formula-
tions differ, they all describe a much heavier plaintiff's burden than merely showing self-
dealing. However, both fraud and overreaching have a conclusory flavor that leaves little of
substance but "motive," "purpose," and "waste" together with the notion of benefits taken
to the exclusion and at the expense of the subsidiary. See supra note 28.
99. See supra text accompanying note 57.
100. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1180-82, 1191-92.
101. SeeTanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Del. 1977); supra
note 68 and accompanying text. The trial court in Weinberger recognized that one of the
values to a parent of increasing its stock ownership to 100% was the ability to extract cash
from a business by declaring dividends solely according to the parent's needs. Weinberger,
426 A.2d at 1333.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 39-73.
103. See supra notes 14, 15 & 20.
104. 367 mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1974).
105. 328 N.E.2d at 511-13.
106. Id. at 518-19.
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this rule to transactions not involving third parties or outsiders. 0 7 The
apparent reason for this limitation is that the court did not want to fore-
close sales of controlling interests to outsiders, which is one of the few
sources of liquidity in a close corporation. Presumably many sales of
small corporations would be disabled by the need for the purchaser to buy
100% of the shares or, if the purchase money were required to be distrib-
uted pro rata, to risk the continued participation of a former controlling
shareholder as a minority shareholder. 08
Without more facts one can easily see how the court reached its decision.
Moreover, the controlling Rodd shareholders had two years before offered
to buy out Donahue interests at a price considerably less than the price
paid Mr. Rodd in the challenged transaction. Thus evidence existed to
suggest that the repurchase of Mr. Rodd's shares was improperly 'moti-
vated. Nevertheless, the case is troublesome because many desirable trans-
actions would be precluded by the rule of strict equal treatment. For
instance, if Mr. Rodd had been unable to retire but for the payment, and
the corporation had had insufficient cash to offer pro rata payments to
other shareholders, the rule would seem to lock everyone into the business,
rather than allowing anyone out.' 0 9 Moreover, the distinction between in-
side and outside transactions breaks down quite readily. Suppose that in-
stead of causing the corporation to purchase his shares, Mr. Rodd
managed to find an outside purchaser. His shares would be salable only
because they represented a controlling interest, and the minority might in-
deed be worse off with a stranger in control than it would be if Mr. Rodd
had been allowed to accomplish the original transaction. It appears doubt-
ful, therefore, that the court could avoid eventually extending the rule of
Donahue to transactions with outsiders.
The alternative to the Donahue rule of strict equal treatment is the busi-
ness purpose test. The factual situations in which the rule of equal treat-
ment fails are those in which an opportunity is indivisible, and the
business purpose test provides the flexibility to deal with these situa-
tions. I0 If in fact the opportunity in question is not indivisible, the busi-
107. Id. at 515 n.18.
108. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 15, at 325-26; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 14, at 1356-57 n.9. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein note that in close corporations,
such as in Donahue, freeze-outs generally arise as a result of continuing controversies ap-
proaching deadlock, thus generating very different issues from those arising in public corpo-
rations. See infra text accompanying notes 145-49. They also note that in the context of
parent-subsidiary mergers, the benefits are hardly ever indivisible. See supra text accompa-
nying note 94; infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. Close corporations and public
corporations have vital differences. That fact does not, however, affect the basic thesis here,
nor does it invalidate all comparisons of close corporations and public corporations. Indeed,
one would presume some similarities between two kinds of organizations going by the same
name and, in some states, organized under precisely the same statutes.
109. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515; Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No
Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987, 1003 (1974); Brudney, supra note 14, at 1053; Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 14, at 1369; cf. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 15, at 306 (asserting
that parent's control over market price of subsidiary shares renders right of appraisal ineffec-
tive when a conflict of interest, rather than managerial incompetence, is involved).
110. See supra note 108.
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ness purpose test leads to the conclusion that an alternative more injurious
to the minority was chosen for no good reason, indicating that equitable
relief is appropriate." '
A mere two years after Donahue the Massachusetts court, not surpris-
ingly, reconsidered the rule of strict equal treatment. In Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc.," 2 the court expressed its concern that
indiscriminate application of the rule of strict equal treatment would jeop-
ardize legitimate corporate action, noting that controlling shareholders
have at least some privilege of selfish enjoyment of their property.'" 3 In
Wilkes the owner of a substantial interest in the nursing home was un-
seated from the board of directors and relieved of his management respon-
sibilities apparently because of a personal conflict with one of the other
managing shareholders. As a result of losing his job, Wilkes was cut out of
his primary source of financial participation in the corporation. The court
held that Wilkes was indeed entitled to his position, salary, and right to
participate in management, but declined to base that holding on Dona-
hue." 4 The court instead devised a new rule requiring the controlling
shareholders to show a legitimate business objective for the challenged
transaction and giving the minority shareholder an opportunity to show
that the same objective could be achieved by less offensive means. 115
The mutually exclusive relationship between the business purpose test
and the rule of equal treatment thus becomes quite clear, albeit in the con-
text of a close corporation. The same conflict is implicit in the Delaware
freeze-out cases, wherein minority shareholders sought equality in being
allowed to retain their investments." 6 In contested takeovers the issue
arises in terms of the power of managers to retain control and to deprive
the minority of considerable gains.' 17 The conflict is less evident in Sin-
clair, but is still present because the noninvestment policy clearly favored
the controlling majority."l 8 Use of the business purpose standard signals
recognition of a certain level of privilege to insiders when an indivisible
benefit is available.' 19 Business purpose, therefore, should be the focus in
any sale of control case, but the courts have rarely reviewed such transac-
tions.' 20 This lack of review is partly because a sale of control by a con-
trolling shareholder is obviously a matter of legitimate shareholder interest
111. See supra notes 57 & 98 and accompanying text; infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
112. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
113. 353 N.E.2d at 663; cf Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1123
(Del. 1977) (parent corporation does not violate its duties as majority stockholder in subsidi-
ary by causing cash-out merger when necessary to accomplish parent's financing objectives).
114. 353 N.E.2d at 663.
115. Id; accordJones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969).
116. See supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 22-73 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
119. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 15, at 325-26; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 14, at 1356-57 n.9.
120. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 511-13.
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and only tenuously connected to the conduct of business; the corporation's
funds are not being used. 12' Likewise, the weakness of the business pur-
pose test as applied in a cash-out merger becomes apparent. If one as-
sumes that the minority shareholder's primary concern is making money,
the only issue is whether he is being paid enough. The opportunity to be
cashed out is in no sense indivisible and even if it were, the majority is not
itself claiming it. 122
Nevertheless, the question still remains as to what justifies the minimal
burden of persuasion that is placed on controlling persons when the busi-
ness purpose test is applied. Even in the realm of corporation law, it is
difficult to argue against equality of treatment among shareholders as
somehow an ultimate moral value.123 Equality before the law is, after all,
the very foundation of the political system and is the source of the unique
force of a government of laws.124 Not only does equality guarantee fair-
ness, but it also restrains governmental action; unless a rule can be univer-
salized, it will be held invalid. 25 The principle is so simple that it seems
intuitive that it must apply to corporations, at least in the absence of a
better one. 126 One would think that at the very least a noncontrolling
shareholder should have the opportunity to prove that the injury to him is
greater than the benefit to the insider. Instead, at the most the courts will
sometimes compare the insider's personal and business motivations. 27
What possible justification is there for this institutionalized inequality?
The fact is that equal treatment of shareholders is a valuable concept,
but not a basic goal of corporation law to be applied presumptively in the
absence of any better principle. Moreover, the notion of business purpose
is not amenable to use as a justification for unequal treatment. Business
purpose is recognizable only in what it is not. Many good reasons support
requiring the party challenging a transaction to show that no valid busi-
ness purpose exists, but to require the party defending a transaction either
to show that he had compelling reasons, or that the benefits to him some-
how exceeded in weight the detriment to the outside shareholders, is
inappropriate.
121. See Brudney, supra note 14, at 1053-54. In theory, the source of the money used is
irrelevant. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 393 (Del. Ch. 1979).
Money is a scarce commodity, however, and the fact that an acquiring shareholder has his
own funds and does not need to borrow them should perhaps count for something.
122. See supra text accompanying note 94.
123. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
125. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 49-65 (1962); Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1959).
126. One could fairly say that Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), so
held. Despite the rule, however, mergers were seldom enjoined. One of the few examples is
Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978). A damages formula was devised in-
stead to punish illegitimate mergers. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497
(1981); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
127. For example, trial court recognized in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d at 1350,
that a business purpose need not be compelling to be valid. See supra note 89 and accompa-
nying text.
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In order to understand this logic, one must resort to the very foundations
of corporation law and take a serious look at the rationale for the corpora-
tion in light of competing forms of organization such as partnership.
Among the features that distinguish corporations from other forms of busi-
ness organization is the free transferability of shares. 128 From an inves-
tor's point of view this is a virtue in itself. As long as there is a market, a
share of stock can be turned into cash almost on a moment's notice. In-
deed, a stock's value increases as it becomes more liquid. From the corpo-
ration's point of view, it would be extremely difficult to raise capital unless
investors could be assured of the ability to sell. 129
A general rule of equal treatment is necessary to ensure liquidity. Un-
less participations in corporations are essentially standardized and treat-
ment is therefore largely equal, investment in new issues by any significant
number of people would be precluded by the cost of learning the precise
terms of the deal. 130 Without a general rule of equal treatment, it would
be impossible to raise equity capital other than face to face, and the size of
ventures that may be undertaken would be severely limited.131 Standardi-
zation of share treatment, therefore, not surprisingly is one of the areas
more strictly self-regulated than regulated by law. The states allow unlim-
ited classes of stock. So in theory a corporation could issue separate
classes with differing rights to each shareholder. 132 The stock exchanges,
however, effectively limit the number of classes of common stock that a
listed company may issue and refuse to list any equity issue of a company
that issues nonvoting common stock.' 33
This rationale for equal treatment must be kept in mind. To the extent
128. "Free transferability" means the absence of impediments to transfer. Of course, a
market for the firm's'stock must be available if free transferability is to be much of an
advantage. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 20-23, 281-83; W. KLEIN,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 132-39 (1980).
129. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, pt. 1, 9-19 (1963).
130. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1171-73, 1181-82 (dis-
cussing areas of corporate law recognizing shareholders' inability to monitor management
performance); R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 13 (1978) (discussing
drawbacks of proposals aimed at increasing power of shareholders over corporate destiny).
131. Undoubtedly the best known discussion of this phenomenon is the dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Brandeis in Liggett & Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 578-80 (1933). The Court had
just struck down as unconstitutional a Louisiana tax designed to limit the proliferation of
chain stores. Justice Brandeis bemoaned the demise of limitations on total capital, the scope
of business, and shareholders' powers to control managers, and he characterized corpora-
tions as a threat to democracy in essence because of their monopolization of opportunities.
He did not deny that considerable sums of capital might be required to undertake profitable
projects, but rather suggested that some form of cooperative effort or industrial democracy
would be more consistent with the political system and the fourteenth amendment in partic-
ular. See infra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1983). Illinois, whose constitution prohibits
nonvoting stock, is the prime counterexample, and even that restriction has been severely
diluted. See Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Ill. 2d 471, 272 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1971).
133. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 305, 313 (1983). Un-
doubtedly similar concerns motivate the English in their City Code to discourage tender
offers for less than all outstanding shares and the French Company of Brokers to require
that any premium for control be shared with minority shareholders. A. CONARD, CORPORA-
TIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 209-12 (1976).
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that strict application of equal treatment impedes the substantive corporate
goal of maximizing return on investment, equal treatment must give way.
Shareholders value equal treatment only to the extent that it adds value to
their stock.' 34 Limiting the scope of equal treatment does not necessarily
detract from its liquidity-giving properties. Stockholders can adapt to cer-
tain acceptable forms of unequal treatment that will become standardized
and well known in the market. Moreover, to the extent that unequal treat-
ment is objectionable, a corporation with more than a few shareholders
has little chance to escape sanctions, formal or informal. 35
On reflection it becomes clear that equality of treatment has never been
an especially powerful moral force in corporation law. Typically divi-
dends, liquidation shares, and voting rights are cited as elementary exam-
ples of the centrality of the equality concept. 136 Not even the dividend
example is without exception, however. In lieu of dividends many compa-
nies repurchase shares on the open market, effecting a reverse dilution 37
of shares not sold back. The practice is widely approved, but clearly not
pro rata. The unsuspecting seller gets less than the hold-out and his shares
are by definition purchased for less than the insiders think they are worth.
This is in substance a redistribution of wealth within the corporation. It
can be likened to insider trading undertaken for the benefit of all remain-
ing shareholders. 138
Along with the foregoing examples of required equal treatment can be
included the Williams Act, which governs tender offers. 139 The Act re-
quires that within any one tender offer all tendering shareholders receive
the same price per share and have equal percentages of their tendered
134. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 703-04. That liquidity enhances the value
of stock is, of course, well known. Indeed, destruction of the market for a particular security
has been held actionable. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); United Funds v. Carter Prods., Inc., [1961-1964] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 91,288 (Balt. Cir. Ct. 1963); see Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 916-19
(1975).
135. See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means
Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 402 (1977); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr.
Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 141 N.E.2d 590, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1957) (increase of price by steel erector
did not violate contract with general contractor since increase was effectively "controlled"
by steel company's dealings with numerous other customers). Of course, this effect does not
hold for close corporations, which may account in part for their distinctive treatment. See
generally Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1974). Nor does it hold in those
cases in which the transaction itself will eliminate those who object. See Brudney & Chirel-
stein, supra note 14, at 1368; Note, supra note 134, at 906-09.
136. See Brudney, supra note 14, at 1027. Liquidation shares and voting rights are weak
examples at best; these rights would rarely be distributed unequally at least in any formal
way. But see Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., 352 A.2d 426, 427-28 (Del. Ch. 1976);
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations. Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One
Share, One Vote,"56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44 (1970); Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close
Corporation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1543 (1960).
137. An unfortunate phrase, but probably clearer than the straightforward "concentra-
tion of equity interest."
138. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1983); Brudney, supra note 14, at 1044-50.
139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6), (7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(6), (7) (1982).
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shares purchased.' 40 Rather than being an example of equal treatment,
however, the Williams Act is better regarded as an expression of the wide-
spread belief that equal treatment is a basic value in corporation law. 141
In any event, neither the Williams Act nor decisional law requires equal
treatment of nontendering shareholders, 142 and the Williams Act itself
does not prohibit price discrimination in separate tender offers. 143 Far
from equal treatment being a basic value in corporation law, the sugges-
tion is strong that without some additional justification, unequal treatment
should never be regarded as a sufficient predicate for liability.
Still, the fact that a rule of strict equality may not be necessary only
evens the score. The question remains whether any good reason justifies
unequal treatment. In each of the prototypical cases, the reason for une-
qual treatment was the fact that only one solution was possible. Only one
management team may be in control, and only one dividend policy may be
pursued at a time.' nn Unless one is willing to entertain the possibility that
no one prevail when such matters as these are seriously disputed, some
device must be available to force a conclusion.
Corporation law embodies a systematic bias in favor of reaching deci-
sions. Failure to decide is a recognized exception to the business judgment
rule. 145 This contrasts sharply with partnerships in which deadlock readily
leads to dissolution.' 46 Corporations, on the other hand, are almost impos-
sible to dissolve for mere impasse, 147 which encourages reaching a decision
even when those in control might otherwise be reluctant to decide. Un-
doubtedly this bias for action rather than inaction is an important reason
that so much attention is paid in the codes and by the courts to formalities
of meetings. To encourage action the law virtually forces face-to-face con-
frontation among directors. 148 Thus, the tools of forcing a solution are
naturally in the hands of those who control the corporation. To insist that
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 (Nov. 29, 1979). If a bidder
were allowed to raise the bid during the course of a tender offer without being required to
pay the new price to those who had already tendered, much of the rationale for proration
would be eliminated. Shareholders would not be encouraged to tender at less than a price
they believe to be adequate, knowing that they will receive any increased benefit if enough
of the others hold out for more.
142. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 336-40; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 20, at 1361-62.
143. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
144. Freeze-outs, though no longer governed by the business purpose rule, fell in the
latter category. See supra text accompanying note 94.
145. Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Arsht,
supra note 1, at 112-14.
146. See, e.g., Ferrick v. Barry, 320 Mass. 217, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (1946); UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 31, 32 (1981).
147. See, e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563, 564 (1954);
Chayes, supra note 136, at 1545; Hetherington & Dooley, lliquidity and Exploitation: A
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 3
(1977).
148. See, e.g., Hurley v. Ornsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 42 N.E.2d 273, 275-76 (1942); Stone v.
American Lacquer Solvents Co., 463 Pa. 417, 345 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT §§ 43, 44 (1979).
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they be elsewhere would amount to a presumption that management is
almost always in the wrong. 149
Moreover, positive reasons do exist as to why incumbents should have
an edge. A corporation is a three-way bargain between a government,
shareholders, and management. 50 The bargain between the shareholders
and management is straightforward: shareholders would not put their
money into the corporation unless they expected a return. Moreover, they
must expect a greater return than is available to them in other less risky
investments.' 15 A corporation thus has a duty to invest profitably at a
return in excess of the cost of the funds being used. If investors demand
payments of ten percent for their money, the corporation is supposed to
find investments returning something more than ten percent.152 A corpora-
tion can not justify retaining equity when a shareholder can put it to better
use. 153
The necessity of the business purpose doctrine arises directly from man-
agement's role in this bargain. Finding and managing investments that
return more than prevailing rates of interest involves a decision to devote
capital for varied reasons. Often, management uses little more than
hunches that hardly ever can be justified in the sense that most people,
provided with all the facts, would agree that the investment is the one that
should be made.154 To strike an analogy with standards of judicial review,
the strictest test one could apply would be to allow reversal of a manager's
decision when unsupported by the evidence, which is the equivalent of the
irrationality exception to the business judgment rule. 55 The fact that a
business decision may be against the weight of the evidence is not enough
149. Certainly this presumption has its followers, although they would likely stop short
of advocating a scheme that overtly encouraged ouster of incumbents. After all, if power
corrupts, it will get the insurgents too. See Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure,
66 VA. L. REV. 85 passim (1980); supra notes 64 & 72.
150. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819); R. WIN-
TER, supra note 130.
151. SeeW. KLEIN, supra note 128, at 214-15, 254-56; J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANA-
GERIAL FINANCE ch. 17 (6th ed. 1978).
152. Since investment is almost invariably riskier than the status quo, most companies
would be expected to establish a required return for new investments somewhat in excess of
the rate actually demanded by shareholders before the new investment. J. WESTON & E.
BRIGHAM, supra note 151, ch. 10. For an example of this method of investment decision-
making in context, see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
153. The shareholder's appraisal right, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983), is some-
times said to have been intended to allow a shareholder to demand a return of his invest-
ment if the corporation significantly changes the nature of its business. See Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25, 29-30 (1958).
154. SeeJ. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 151, at 287; Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1195-97. Even if gathering all the available information about
investment opportunities were possible, a consensus would probably not develop. A notable
example came from the National Science Foundation, which recently disclosed that even it
has been unable to devise a method by which to evaluate the relative merit of grant requests.
See generally W. KOHLER, THE PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS (1938).
155. See Arsht, supra note 1, at 97-100, 121-27; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role,
supra note 59, at 1195-97; cf Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1960)
(jury verdict may only be reversed if no substantial evidence supports verdict).
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to justify second-guessing the manager. 56
If the concern is that deadlock may prevent the employment of assets
altogether, it makes sense to grant incumbents the residual ability to force
their own way when a real risk of impasse exists, even to the extent of
favoring their personal interests over those of other shareholders.157 In the
first place, business activity is fundamentally different from government
activity, because governments have traditionally engaged primarily in pro-
hibition. 158 Such decisions are fairly easily subjected to vote, at least in
theory, since the alternatives are only to prohibit or not to prohibit. Thus,
simple majority rule is quite serviceable. 159 Making an investment deci-
sion, however, is quite another process. Innumerable alternatives are
available, many of which will be eliminated as unprofitable, but no reason
dictates that the remaining alternatives will only number two. 160 When
the alternatives are greater in number, the results of a vote may well de-
pend upon the order in which the alternatives are presented.
Few would seriously propose that major business decisions be made by
shareholder vote, or a vote of any other constituency. Numerous propos-
als, however, have been made to replicate the diversity of constituent inter-
ests and to ensure that they are considered during board deliberations.
16 1
If the rationale for these proposals is simply to reproduce the result that
would obtain if only a full shareholder vote could be held, they are subject
to the same shortcomings. Any effort to divine the will of the majority,
156. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Co., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952).
157. Whether an impasse has been reached in any particular case is a decision largely
controlled by economic forces. Managers, whether or not they are themselves substantial
shareholders, will not undertake any of the actions governed by the business purpose rule
unless they believe it will be profitable or will avoid a decrease in profitability. See supra
notes 64 & 68 and accompanying text.
158. Justice Douglas stated in the context of advocating self-regulation in the securities
industry:
Self-regulation . . . can be pervasive and subtle in its conditioning influence
over business practices and business morality. By and large, government can
operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That leaves untouched large areas
of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of government regulation but in
fact too minute for satisfactory control; some of it lying beyond the periphery
of the law in the realm of ethics and morality. Into these large areas self-
government, and self-government alone, can effectively reach.
Address by SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas as quoted in Jennings, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry. The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 663, 678 (1964).
159. See supra text accompanying note 116; cf. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 14, at
1359-65 (majority rule in arm's length mergers is coercive but unobjectionable).
160. The process is particularly complex because of the impossibility of precise measure-
ment of risk and, to a lesser extent, the cost of capital. See supra notes 151 & 152.
161. See, e.g., ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report of Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978); Eisenberg, supra note 17; Ratner, supra
note 136, at 44-56; Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest. Reflections on Campaign
GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 520-28 (1971); Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1490-
91 (1958) (reviewing J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)). A similar ar-
gument is often made in favor of cumulative voting. See also Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing generally concept of corporate
democracy), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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whether by direct vote or otherwise, is inherently unreliable. 162
An alternative rationale for the rule of equal treatment is that given
enough time and information, a consensus would develop that takes all
competing interests into account, but this reasoning is questionable. An
investment decision is one that cannot be completely justified or ex-
plained. 163 A new product may not appear in advance to be particularly
useful, but may become indispensable in use. The argument may always
be made that until now consumers have managed to get along without it.
Thus, justifying any further investment other than to replace aging assets
may be impossible. 164 Undoubtedly a few consumer-voters will always
perceive the utility of a proposed new product distinctly enough that they
would, if asked, vote to devote scarce resources to its development; but the
chances of any proposal's commanding a majority, or even out-polling the
alternative of no action, are slim. Innovation depends upon individual ac-
tion and vision.165 Finally, a project conceived or even approved by some
form of voting will likely be compromised to such an extent that no one
will be motivated enough to manage it vigorously to fruition. No matter
how much one may believe in the virtues of majority rule, the fact is that
business is done by individuals who must be rewarded. 66
If innovation is agreed in principle to be important, some means must be
found to make productive assets available to the individuals who would
manage innovative projects. If one fully expects that such "unjustifiable"
ventures are to be undertaken, some mechanism must be provided by
which the manager's discretion will not in the normal course be second-
guessed or subject to prior restraint by the very forces that the mechanism
is intended to overcome. 167 Corporations and the business judgment rule
are, by and large, well devised to avoid the shortcomings of majority rule
and to allow in an appropriately regulated environment the necessary
room for individually initiated action.
162. Cf., SEC, Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess., Part 8, at 124-25 (197 1) (existence of power of institutions such as banks to influence
corporate decisions by vote does not demonstrate that it is in fact exercised). But see Wer-
ner, supra note 135, at 402.
163. See supra note 153.
164. But see J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 203-07 (1967), in which the
author argues that primarily through advertising producers can create demand or at least
accurately predict it and hence that risk has largely been eliminated.
165. Note the parallel to the contradiction between status quo and dynamism. The prop-
osition has often been made that private enterprise is in fact a better system than govern-
ment ownership for the conduct of business. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM &
FREEDOM 4 (1962); J. SCHUMPETER, CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? 61-70 (1942).
166. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1169-70. The as-
sumption is often made that because corporations have a legal existence separate from any
of the individuals that might be said to compose them, incentives are largely irrelevant and
the fiduciary status of managers is paramount. A more reasonable assumption is that corpo-
rations have the character of human beings, rather than the opposite, and to adjust fiduciary
duties appropriately.
167. This is not to say that managers should be relieved of any accountability. Indeed,
the business judgment rule is not a particularly lax standard. See Arsht, supra note 1, pas-
sim. Moreover, internal bureaucratic pressure is probably a more powerful restraint than
the law, and some reasons dictate its preference as a rule of law.
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IV. A RESTATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS PURPOSE DOCTRINE
One can easily see how the business purpose test can look like a license
to use a corporate office to promote self-interest. Under circumstances in
which a manager's self-interest is inevitably apparent, the only circum-
stances in which the business purpose test is necessary, self-interest will
almost always appear to be the more convincing explanation. Nonethe-
less, if the view here proposed is correct, the propriety of the relatively
light burden on defendants is much clearer.
The essential justification for the business purpose rule, and for permit-
ting a limited level of unequal treatment, is that the rule and the resulting
inequity are necessary to rational investment. However, since use of the
business purpose test signals that unequal treatment will be tolerated, one
would expect that the behavior in question have some demonstrable con-
nection to the investment process, at the very least that the challenged ac-
tion may often be undertaken to further investment goals. Defensive
tactics in tender offers are an obvious example. Less easy to see, however,
is how all of this applies in the use of control cases. To understand that
connection, one must look again to the nature of the bargain between
managers and shareholders.
Simply stated, managers agree to make money for shareholders and
shareholders agree to allow managers considerable freedom in doing so.1
68
Thus, corporation law generally protects the manager's discretion to
choose investments, but consistent with the bargain between the corpora-
tion and the shareholders, the law imposes a duty on the manager to pay
dividends when no qualifying investment opportunities are apparent.
169
The famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 170 illustrates this bargain
very well. The company had been paying substantial dividends, both reg-
ular and special, for several years when Henry Ford, a fifty-eight percent
168. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 59, at 1170-71. This rela-
tionship should not be regarded as purely fiduciary and equivalent to trusteeship, as com-
mentators of all persuasions seem to do. The relationship is just as understandable as a
contractual one, because both parties have something the other wants. Even if selfish mo-
tives in fact preponder, we should not necessarily bemoan advantage-taking by insiders and
seek a way of distinguishing one from the other. After all, perpetuating oneself in office is
necessary if one is to direct investments.
169. One can not always easily discern if dividends are being paid, since they may come
in the form of cash or growth. The latter, of course, depends on the market, that is, the
perceptions of shareholders. Thus dividends are paid if shareholders think that they are.
See generally J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 151, ch. 20. When considering cash
dividends, one cannot ignore the effect of taxes. Shareholders may, to a certain extent, pre-
fer that a corporation retain cash even if it does not have investment opportunities, since the
money will be taxed if paid out as dividends. However, these factors probably have been
included in the "market's" calculation of the rate of return necessary for a particular invest-
ment. In addition, by selling the stock the shareholder can obtain the retained dividend and
pay taxes at no more than 40% of the rate otherwise payable. While this would suggest a
distinct preference for retention, it nonetheless depends on the expectation of subsequent
purchasers that the money will eventually be paid out in cash by the corporation. Id, ch. 17.
Taxes do, therefore, affect shareholder preference for dividends, but it is fair to assume that
such effects are built into what the market communicates to investors. See infra note 177.
170. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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shareholder, declared that no more special dividends would be paid. He
planned to use the money to expand the company's operations, while cut-
ting the price of cars. The surplus of the corporation was $112 million at
the time, of which $54 million was cash or near cash. Two minority share-
holders sued to compel a dividend declaration of not less than three-
fourths of the surplus. They introduced evidence that the expansion plans
were not intended to make the company more profitable, and indeed
would make it less profitable over the short term, but instead were moti-
vated by the social concerns of Henry Ford.
In a decision still regarded as gospel on the subject, the Michigan
Supreme court held that:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.17
The court, however, did not interfere with the proposed expansion. As the
court further stated:
We are not, however, persuaded that we should interfere with the
proposed expansion of the business of the Ford Motor Company. In
view of the fact that the selling price of products may be increased at
any time, the ultimate results of the larger business cannot be cer-
tainly estimated. The judges are not business experts. 172
Thus, the court refused to interfere with the directors' discretion to invest
as they saw fit, even though they were unable to show that their strategy
would lead to greater profits.
The expansion plans, however, required only approximately $24 mil-
lion, leaving liquid assets of nearly $30 million for which there were no
particular plans. The directors argued that the business simply needed to
have cash. While the court agreed that as a general proposition corpora-
tions do need cash, it affirmed the lower court's order that half of the "ex-
tra" cash be paid out as a dividend. 73 Simply stated, a corporation may
not retain equity for no good purpose. 174
The situation in Sinclair175 was the converse of that in Dodge. In Sin-
clair the minority shareholder's complaint was that the corporation was
paying dividends when it could have been investing. One has difficulty
seeing how the business purpose test can apply at all in such a case, since
the shareholders are getting what they bargained for. The shareholders
can complain about the corporation's failure to retain earnings only if
171. 170 N.W. at 684.
172. Id
173. Id. at 685; see id at 677.
174. See Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480, 483 (Sup. Ct.
1962); W. KLEIN, supra note 128, at 254-56.
175. See supra text accompanying note 95.
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management somehow promised to pursue a growth strategy (and some-
how promised not to change its mind). Even then something approaching
active fraud would need to be shown, since management cannot fairly be
thought to guarantee success.
The applicability of the business purpose test in Sinclair is easier to see if
one considers the consequences of the alternative to presuming manage-
ment's right to pay dividends. The plaintiff in Sinclair complained that the
money was not invested, not that it was paid out. To hold managers liable
for not investing necessarily requires them to make particular investments,
since minority shareholders must identify particular opportunities in order
to make out any case. The courts will not presume to find liability in such
a case; that is merely the business judgment rule in its ordinary
application.
The ultimate point of Sinclair is more significant. First, as a matter of
sound policy the courts should not require that a business grow or refrain
from shrinking. As long as they declare dividends, managers will not be
required to invest at all, even though opportunities exist. To impose such a
requirement would often be wasteful and would unduly limit the range of
decisions available. As a practical matter, such a requirement could not be
enforced anyway, since investment decisions are so subjective that the
manager could always argue convincingly that the investment was not a
good one. Corporations are designed to enable growth, not to enforce it,
because ultimately growth cannot be forced.
In this context the business purpose test differs from the simple policy of
noninterference that underlies the business judgment rule. Self-dealing
and failure to manage could have been the court's focus in Sinclair. Those
tests did not apply, however, because applying them would have added
terms to the bargain between managers and shareholders that were not
originally present and, more important, would have injected an element of
affirmative mandate into an institution founded on the opposite. Under
their bargain with shareholders, corporate managers are privileged not
only to choose investments, but also to choose between the two basic and
mutually exclusive policies of paying dividends by growth or by cash. 176
One further point must be addressed. It has been argued that a corpora-
tion's dividend policy is irrelevant, since a shareholder can always sell a
few shares when he wants some cash. 177 The Irrelevance Proposition, as
this hypothesis has been dubbed, holds that the cash the corporation has
retained will be reflected in the market price of the shares. The price may
even be augmented if it is generally believed that the corporation has
found or will find investment opportunities yielding more than those that
comprise its current business. A shareholder, therefore, should not care
176. See supra note 169.
177. This view was first set forth by Miller and Modigliani in their now famous Dividend
Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961). See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 429-42; Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67
VA. L. REV. 699, 701-02 (1981).
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about a firm's dividend policy, or indeed should prefer that the corpora-
tion retain its cash.' 78 By the same token, it would seem that the option of
paying extravagant dividends should not be open to management.
In the first place, the Irrelevance Proposition seems to depend on a rule
requiring either dividend payments or reinvestment in still more profitable
projects. But for the rule, corporations would be free to accumulate cash
for no particular purpose and shareholders would no longer be indifferent
between dividends and retention. Second, as with the argument against
allowing incumbents to oppose tender offers, the Irrelevance Proposition
does not take into account the fact that the vast majority of a corporation's
shareholders probably believe their stock is worth more than the market
price. 179 Thus if they had to sell a few shares to obtain a dividend they
would have to sell at what they believed to be a loss. Moreover, most
corporations are not likely to have many investment opportunities that
yield enough above their current business to justify the added risk.' 80 The
chances are that most companies have some ability to expand the existing
enterprise without increasing risk, but that many opportunities that could
yield more would, if invested in, depress the price of the company's stock.
The leftover cash would be worth more as cash. Other things being equal,
the shareholder would rather have it than let the corporation keep it. And
the only way he can get all of it is through a dividend. Viewed from a
slightly different angle, one might say that dividends are the shareholders'
only means of participating in the unrealizable excess-over-market value
since dividends are the only way the shareholder can get cash and not have
to forgo the excess.
If one accepts the proposition that shareholders can legitimately disa-
gree with the value placed on their investment by the market, then clearly
management's decision to grow or to pay dividends is central to a share-
holder's decision to invest in a particular stock.'l8 Indeed the complexity
of the management decision and the legitimacy of disagreement about it
strongly support the notion that investors can disagree as to the correct
value of a share of stock.
Thus, both a growth policy and a dividend policy are legitimate corpo-
rate objectives. The choice between them is a matter in which sharehold-
ers have a direct enough interest to justify some level of intervention in the
directors' sphere of authority, as for example, when dividends are not paid
even though no investment opportunities exist. Nevertheless, both the ma-
jority and the minority as shareholders, as opposed to fiduciaries, may,
within the terms of the bargain, act in their own self-interests.
The business purpose doctrine contemplates precisely such situations in
which satisfying everyone with a single dividend policy is impossible. In
178. See supra note 169.
179. See supra text accompanying note 66; J. WILLIAMS, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT
VALUE 11-41 (1938).
180. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 151, at 796-801.
181. Id at 800-01; W. KLEIN, supra note 128, at 256-58.
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such cases majority rule and the privilege to vote selfishly are perfectly
appropriate. 82 Functionally, the business purpose approach fits the situa-
tion by giving the majority free reign to promote its own interest as long as
unnecessary damage is not done to the minority.183 The name, unfortu-
nately, obscures the nature of the rule.
Freeze-outs may be viewed as quite similar to disputes over dividends.
To simplify the circumstances greatly, freeze-outs arise when the majority
thinks the company is worth more than the minority does. Otherwise, the
majority would not be willing to buy out the minority, and certainly not at
a premium. 8 4 Since shareholders value dividends, the reason for the dis-
pute must be that the majority perceives less risk or a higher return than
the minority does.18 5 The minority disagrees with the majority: the mi-
nority believes that for the amount of risk taken, dividends should be
greater.
In effect, the majority is in violation of the bargain with shareholders by
retaining equity unjustifiably to the extent that it is able to pay higher divi-
dends. What distinguishes the freeze-out, however, is that when cash is
available to buy out the minority, no need arises to choose between the
objectives of the majority and the minority. The minority can have its
dividend, albeit in the form of a cash-out, and the majority can have its
investment program. Given the chance, shareholders would agree to une-
qual treatment under these circumstances.
The business purpose doctrine thus would seem to require that a minor-
ity be frozen out when indicated and possible. The use of the doctrine in
Singer to make freeze-outs more difficult was, in retrospect, curious. In
truth, the doctrine was misapplied. The burden placed on the defendants
was considerably greater than in other applications. Insiders were gener-
ally required to show a compelling purpose and not simply a legitimate
objective, which, until the decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., led to judi-
cial blindness to the most important aspects of legitimately competing
shareholder interests. 186 The courts had in effect required that the major-
ity demonstrate that it was being positively harmed by the minority, but
the most that should have been demanded was a showing that the majority
was doing no harm to the minority.' 87 As the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized in Weinberger, business purpose always exists in the context of
a freeze-out.1 88 At most the business purpose doctrine tells us, indirectly,
that inasmuch as one side must win, it is appropriate when possible to
ensure that the loser is treated fairly.' 89
182. See supra text accompanying notes 60-73.
183. See supra text accompanying note 115.
184. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 394 (Del. Ch. 1979).
185. See supra note 66.
186. 457 A.2d at 715; see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 14, at 1375-76; Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 15, at 725; Weiss, supra note 80, at 667-71.
187. See supra note 57.
188. 457 A.2d at 715; see Weiss, supra note 80, at 671 n.300.
189. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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The duty to pay dividends, and the occasional duty to freeze-out a mi-
nority, suggest a corollary duty to sell a business when someone bids more
than the majority's perceived value. Debate abounds as to whether third-
party sale value should figure in a court's review of the fairness of a freeze-
out.190 In the case of a successfully defended takeover bid, one will never
know with certainty how much the insiders thought the corporation was
worth. The duty to sell out would thus be unenforceable. Little need for
requiring a sale would be present, however, since the manager would have
a powerful self-interest, both monetary and professional, in selling a com-
pany for more than its value.
When the candidate for sale is a firmly controlled subsidiary, however,
the parent may attempt to pay less in a freeze-out than it could get from a
third party in order to appropriate to itself a portion of the value of the
company represented by the minority shares. 19 1 Under the new regime
established by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. in Delaware, the third-party sale
value will probably be a factor considered only if the merger is fraudulent
and should not lead to awards of higher prices after simple appraisal pro-
ceedings in which no fraud has been shown. 19 2
The question that remains, however, is whether minority shareholders
may compel a cash-out when the majority refuses for no good reason to
accept an offer at a price in excess of the value perceived by the majority.
To prove that the majority did not regard the subsidiary as more valuable
than the offeror did would be extremely difficult, but arguably that would
be irrelevant. The rejected offer, if sufficiently in excess of market price,
might itself demonstrate either that the majority had behaved irrationally,
or that it was arbitrarily refusing to pay dividends. As yet, there is no
reason to believe that shareholders who sue on such a theory will prevail,
but there is every reason to expect the matter to be litigated vigorously in
the future.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the business purpose doctrine is closely connected to circum-
stances in which unequal treatment is permissible in the sense that a con-
trolling shareholder may use his position within limits for his own selfish
ends. As a general rule, the limits are situations in which a choice must be
made and one of the alternatives is to favor the majority's interest.
Typically, the choice will be forced because management believes that
current investment strategy renders the company more valuable than is
generally believed. Of course, that is very difficult, if not impossible, to
prove since risk alone is a sufficiently subjective factor to allow incumbents
190. See, e.g., Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public
Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard 36 Bus. LAW. 1439(1981); Mirvis, supra note 67. Weinberger itself is the latest judicial statement on the ques-
tion and is potentially a very significant one.
191. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 332.
192. See 457 A.2d at 703.
1984]
886 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
to construct a credible case under almost any circumstances. Thus in prac-
tice one can only look for evidence of lack of business purpose and that
evidence, to be convincing, will tend to be such as shows that less onerous
alternative courses of action were possible.
Undoubtedly, the business purpose test can be and sometimes is abused.
Attempting to overcome the abuse by balancing personal motivations
against business purposes is, however, not appropriate. The rule only ap-
plies in those situations in which, as a matter of sound political and eco-
nomic policy, the personal motivations of a majority shareholder, who
happen also to be a fiduciary, should be recognized as legitimate.
